This book argues that Germans and Austrians have dealt with the Nazi past very differently and that these differences have had important consequences for political culture and partisan politics in the two countries. Drawing on different literatures in political science, David Art builds a framework for understanding how public deliberation transforms the political environment in which it occurs. The book analyzes how public debates about the "lessons of history" created a culture of contrition in Germany that prevented a resurgent far right from consolidating itself in German politics after unification. By contrast, public debates in Austria nourished a culture of victimization that provided a hospitable environment for the rise of right-wing populism. The argument is supported by evidence from nearly 200 semistructured interviews and an analysis of the German and Austrian print media over a twenty-year period.
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Art, David, 1972-The politics of the Nazi past in Germany and Austria / David Art. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-521-85683-3 (hardback) -isbn 0-521-67324-0 (pbk.) 1. Germany -Politics and government. 2. Austria -Politics and government. 3. Political culture -Germany. 4. Political culture -Austria. 5. National socialism -Germany. 6. National socialism -Austria. I. This book analyzes the influence of the Nazi past on postwar German and Austrian politics. Given the omnipresence of that past in both societies, and given the tomes that have already been written on the subject of historical memory in Germany in particular, this was from the start an audacious enterprise. My interviewees often told me as much, and many friends feared that nothing really new could be written about the subject. Yet from the early stages of my research, I became convinced that the connections between ideas about the Nazi past, political culture, and partisan competition in the two societies had barely been uncovered. Sometimes it is the influence of the 800-pound gorilla in the room that is most difficult to measure. When the gorilla takes the form of an idea, rather than a structural or institutional force, elucidating and measuring its effects become even more difficult. Yet, ideas clearly matter in politics. Shying away from phenomena as significant as interpretations of the rise of Nazism and the Final Solution in the successor societies of the Third Reich was no longer an option once my inquiry began, attractive as it seemed at times. I never intended to write about public deliberation and debates, much less offer a framework for analyzing the ways in which they can transform politics. Yet, the deeper I delved into ideas about the Nazi past, the clearer it became that the engine of ideational change was elite-led public debates. These public debates occurred in a discontinuous fashion and produced enduring legacies that shaped not only future debates about the Nazi past, but also the political environment more generally. I found intellectual sustenance for this observation from diverse fields in political science, borrowing liberally from studies of issue evolution, media effects, public Preface and Acknowledgments opinion, deliberative democracy, and historical institutionalism. My hope is that students and scholars working in these fields, whether or not they are intrinsically interested in the Nazi past, may find the approach I have taken useful. One of my central arguments is that debates about the Nazi past have created very different environments for right-wing political parties and movements in Germany and Austria. I thus offer a political-cultural explanation for the divergent success of the postwar far right in Germany and Austria, one that challenges several of the prevailing theories in the literature. Although I admittedly do not test the hypothesis in this book, I believe that the long-term development of right-wing populist parties is critically influenced by the reaction of political parties, the media, and civil society to them. Despite several recent setbacks in some states (including Austria), their power and influence continue to grow in others. The rise of right-wing populist parties has clearly been one of the most dramatic changes in European politics over the past several decades, and uncovering the elements that help or hinder their development is an important area of research, particularly as European integration, immigration, and globalization raise the types of issues around which the far right appears positioned to mobilize.
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